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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
VERA S. KING, J 
Plaintiff and Respondent, f 
vs. \ No. 8071 
F. F. HINTZE, \ 
Defendant and Appellant. I 
Brief of Plaintiff and Respondent 
Introduction 
This case was tried before a jury in the court of the 
Hon. Ray Van Cott. After the completion of the evidence, Judge 
Van Cott instructed the jury that the evidence established a 
breach of contract on the part of the defendant and that the 
defendant had failed to introduce evidence sufficient to con-
stitute a defense to said breach. The jury was therefore in-
structed that they should return a verdict of nominal damages 
for the plaintiff and that they should take under consideration 
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the matter of compensatory damages. The jury returned a 
verdict of 6c nominal damages and $4500.00 compensatory 
damages. From that verdict this appeal was taken by the de-
fendant. As the plaintiff does not agree in its entirety with the 
Statement of Fact contained in the Brief of the appellant, we 
will here set forth at some detail the facts as we feel the record 
shows them to be. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sometime prior to the year 1950, Mrs. Vera S. King and 
Edwin G. Kidder had jointly acquired a mining lease and 
option on four patented mining claims and one unpatented 
mining claim located in the White Pine Mining District, White 
Pine County, State of Nevada. These claims were known as 
the Ora, West Onetha, the Onetha, the Milwaukee, and the 
Cedar Ridge No. 1. Mining operations had been in progress 
for some time on the Ora and Onetha claims (T. 15). The 
evidence contains the settlement sheets on the ore which had 
been removed from these claims previous to the 24th day 
of June, 1950 (Ex. 4) . In the late fall of 1949 one P. C. Rey-
nolds, acting on behalf of Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder, em-
ployed a Mr. Casselli, a mining engineer residing in the state 
of Nevada, to locate some mining claims surrounding the 
claims covered by the mining lease and option above men-
tioned (T. 16-19). Casselli proceeded to file location notices 
on 17 claims surrounding the claims covered by the mining 
lease and option. As winter closed in shortly after the location 
notices were filed, the location work on these claims was not 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
done in the winter of 1949 and 1950, and had not been done 
on the 24th day of June, 1950, when the agreement, which is 
the subject of this law suit, was entered into between Mr. 
Kidder and Mrs. King, on the one hand, and F. F. Hintze, 
on the other (T. 20). However, no intervening rights had 
been filed. 
Mr. F. F. Hintze is a mining engineer who has long been 
connected with the mining department of the University of 
Utah. He was associated in business with Kidder. In the spring 
of 1950, Hintze went to New York City where he talked to 
some people interested in putting money in a mining venture 
in the West (T. 202). Hintze evidently knew about the Kidder-
King properties from his association with Kidder. Upon his 
return to Salt Lake City, Hintze contacted Kidder regarding 
acquiring the mining lease and option above mentioned and 
the unpatented claims which are above discussed. Kidder ex-
pressed his willingness (T. 193-195). Thereupon Hintze con-
tacted Mrs. King to determine whether or not she was will-
ing to sell her interest in these claims (T-170-173). Mrs. 
King considered the matter for a day or two and then advised 
Hintze that she v a^s willing. Accordingly, Hintze drew up the 
agreement and the assignment which is the subject of this 
law suit (T. 22). Mrs. King went to Hintze's office and there 
signed the agreement. Kidder signed at the same time. 
As is stated in the statement of facts in appellant's brief, 
this agreement constituted an assignment to Hintze of the 
mining lease and option which Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder 
owned. In exchange for this, Hintze agreed to form a cor-
poration and to convey to Kidder and Mrs. King, in exchange 
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for the mining lease and option, 1,250,000 shares of stock 
of a par value of 10c per share in said corporation to be 
formed. The agreement also provided that Mrs. King and 
Mr. Kidder would execute and deliver to Hintze or to the 
company to be organized by him a Quit Claim Deed to the 
unpatented mining claims mentioned above and also to the 
Charter Oak, a patented claim, and one-third interest in the 
Monitor Reindeer Survey, also a patented claim. The evidence 
indicates that Hintze never did follow through on the loca-
tion and development work on the unpatented mining 
claims. However, he did proceed to re-locate them, not in 
the name of Kidder and King, but in his own name (T. 132, 
160). The evidence is undisputed that Hintze never formed 
the corporation. 
I. THERE WAS NO BREACH OF THE TERMS OF 
THE AGREEMENT BY KIDDER AND KING. 
(a) THE MINING LEASE AND OPTION WERE IN 
GOOD STANDING. 
In his appeal to this court the defendant, Hintze, has 
based his entire case on an alleged deficiency in the location 
work on the unpatented mining claims. He has raised no 
question on appeal as to the status of the case and option, 
although in the court below and in all the correspondence 
which appears in evidence, his original assigned reason for 
failing to go through with the contract was that the lease 
and option were in default. Evidently the evidence was so 
overwhelming on this point that it has been abandoned by 
Hintze. The respondent brings the point up here only because 
6 
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of the danger that in concentrating only on the unpatented 
mining claims, their importance in this transaction will be 
exaggerated. 
As is stated above Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder held a lease 
and option on the Ora, the Onetha and the Milwaukee claims. 
These were patented claims on which there was an operating 
mine. The unpatented mining claims in question had no 
mine workings on them at all. They surrounded the claims 
which were subject of the lease and option and were considered 
of value in the matter only for the purpose of protecting the 
working claims. Mr. E. W. Newman, a mining engineer em-
ployed by American Smelting and Refining Company, was 
called as a witness by the plaintiff to place a value on the 
properties conveyed by Kidder and King to Hintze. Mr. New-
man stated that in his opinion the total properties, i. e. the 
lease and option on the working claims and the unpatented 
claims surrounding them, were worth a minimum of $25,-
000.00 on a cash deal or a maximum of $50,000.00 on an 
option deal. On cross-examination the defendant asked Mr. 
Newman to break this figure of $25,000.00 down as between 
the lease and option, which was purchased, and the unpatented 
claims surrounding them. Mr. Newman stated that he was 
unable to break the figure down. However, he did state that 
in arriving at his minimum figure of $25,000.00 he had given 
major consideration to the lease and option (T. 78). He stated 
that the showings from the Ora mine were very favorable. 
He stated that he had not even inspected the grounds on 
which the unpatented mining claims were located and had 
assigned value to them only because they surrounded and 
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protected the claims subject to the lease and option which 
were actually being worked. Therefore, the court should keep 
in mind that even if it were true, as we deny, that the plaintiff 
had no property interest in the unpatented mining claims, still 
there was no failure of consideration under the contract be-
cause of the fact that the major element of value in the 
conveyance from Kidder and King to Hintze was the mining 
lease and option on the operating mine, which the defendant 
evidently now admits was in good standing as he has raised 
in this court no question as to its validity. 
(b) THE PLAINTIFF HAD A PROPERTY RIGHT IN 
THE UNPATENTED MINING CLAIMS WHICH COULD 
BE CONVEYED BY QUIT CLAIM DEED. 
The appellant's entire appeal is based upon his contention 
that Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder had no right at all in the un-
patented mining claims and that there was therefore a breach 
in the contract on their part which excused performance on 
his part. His entire brief is devoted to this point. Even if 
Hintze's position that Kidder and King had no property right 
in the unpatented mining claims were true, that would still 
not constitute a defense to the action by Hintze for reasons 
that will be discussed in the next succeeding section. However, 
because respondent does not wish the court to feel that we 
acknowledge this point to be well taken, we wish to discuss 
the matter here. 
Evidently the contention of the appellant in regard to 
the unpatented claims was raised by him in the case as an 
after thought. The evidence shows that he was approached 
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a number of times regarding the formation of the corporation, 
and always excused his non-performance on the ground that 
he was busy, that he did not have sufficient money, and later 
on the ground that the lease and option was in default. 
Never, at any time up to the time this action was brought did 
he raise the point that there was anything wrong with the 
unpatented mining claims. There is in evidence correspondence 
between Mrs. King and Hintze and between counsel in this 
case. Hintze attempts to justify his failure to form a corpora-
tion, but nowhere in this correspondence does there appear 
any reference to any invalidity of the unpatented mining 
claims. Furthermore, in his answer, which was filed on the 
18th day of August, 1952, Hintze does not raise any question 
as to the unpatented mining claims. The sole defense set 
forth in the Answer and Counterclaim is that the mining 
lease and option was in default, which position he has now 
abandoned. It was not until 8 months later, on the 28th 
day of April, 1953', just 20 days before this case came to trial, 
that the defendant filed an Amended Answer and Counter-
claim in which he raised for the first time the question as to 
the questionable character of the unpatented mining claims. 
Hintze certainly was never mislead by Mrs. King as to 
the condition of these unpatented mining claims. The testi-
mony is undisputed that Mrs. King did not approach Mr. 
Hintze on the matter but that he approached her. Furthermore, 
Hintze admits that no representation as to these claims was 
made by Mrs. King. Reynolds testified, without contradiction, 
that prior to the time that Hintze prepared the contract here 
in question, he, Reynolds had told Hintze just what had been 
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done in regard to the unpatented claims. Certainly, therefore, 
Hintze, an experienced mining man, could not have been mis-
lead. Furthermore, the evidence is undisputed that immediately 
after the contract was signed, Hintze rather than carrying 
through on the locations filed in the name of Kidder and 
King the previous fall, elected to make new filings on the 
property in his own name, which he did proceed to do. There-
fore, even if we were to take the position that the location 
notices filed by King and Kidder were invalid because of 
the length of time that had run without the location work 
being done, still that would not be available to Hintze as 
a reason for not going ahead with the formation of the cor-
poration as there had been no intervening claims filed and 
Hintze immediately after the signing of the contract, posted 
location notices on the land in his own name and could have 
followed through with the location work had he elected to 
do so. 
The appellant has quoted at length from statutes of the 
United States and statutes of the state of Nevada relative 
to the location of lode mining claims. We see no purpose in 
restating the statutes here, but will refer to them by number 
as they appear in the brief of the appellant. The United 
States laws require (30 U.S.C.A. 28) that the location of a lode 
mining claim must be distinctly marked on the ground so 
that its boundaries can be readily traced. With this require-
ment, Mr. Casselli complied in filing the location for Mrs. 
King and Mr. Kidder. He did erect monuments on the ground 
and on each monument placed a can and in this can placed the 
description by metes and bounds of the claim in question. 
10 
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There is no requirement in the federal law that the four 
corners of the claim must be actually marked on the ground, 
nor is this requirement found in the laws of many states. The 
laws of the state of Nevada, Sec. 4121, do require that the 
corners be marked. However, in this regard, it may be well 
to review the steps necessary to locate and patent a lode mining 
claim. The first step which is taken is the filing of a location, 
which is done by the erecting of a monument and by the 
placing on the monument a description of the claim the name 
of the claimant and other pertinent information. Under the 
laws of the state of Nevada within 20 days after the posting 
of the notice of location, monuments are to be erected at 
each corner and in the center of the claim. Within 90 days 
after the posting of the notice of location, a discovery shaft 
should be driven. After the discovery shaft is driven, the 
claimant may then file his claim for record in the office of 
the County Recorder. Then after doing the necessary develop-
ment work and complying with the other requirements under 
the law, the filing may ripen into a patent. In this case, the 
monuments were placed and the location notices were properly 
placed on the monuments. However, it is not disputed that 
the four corners were not marked out within 20 days, nor 
is it disputed that the discovery shaft was not sunk within 
90 days. Attention of the court, however, is called to the testi-
mony of the witness Reynolds that winter set in immediately 
after the filing of the location notices. He testified that the 
claims were at an elevation of some 8,000 feet and that it 
was impossible to even get to the claims during the time that 
the snow was on the ground. Obviously, therefore, regardless 
of what the statutes provide, it would have been a physical 
11 
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impossibility to follow through with the marking of the corners 
or with the sinking of the discovery shaft within the time 
required by the statute. This is the situation that was intended 
to be taken care of by Section 1563 from the Compiled Laws 
of Nevada, which reads as follows: 
"The location and transfers of mining claims here-
tofore made shall be established and proved in con-
testation before the courts, by the local rules, regula-
tions, or customs of the miners in the several mining 
districts of the territory in which such location and 
transfers were made." 
Reynolds was qualified as an expert and testified that 
he had filed claims in the same mining district and was ac-
quainted with the customs in the area (Tr. 20). He testified 
that it was the custom in this area, due to the severe winters, 
that the time in which to place the corner markings and 
which to sink a discovery shaft was waived during the period 
that weather prevented access to the mining property. Such 
appears to have been a logical rule, and in fact is the rule that 
has been adopted by the Supreme Court of the state of Utah 
for this state. 
In the case of Brockbank v. Albion Mining Company, 29 
Utah 367, the court in discussing this very question stated: 
"While the boundaries were not fully marked on 
the day the location notice was posted because the 
snow then being from 10 to 15 feet deep, it was im-
practical to do so, still the notice having contained a 
full description of the claim by courses and distance 
from the discovery monument where it was posted 
and the claim being a re-location of one covering the 
12 
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same ground, the corners of which were yet substan-
tially in place, the location was at least sufficient to 
entitle a locator to perfect it within a reasonable time 
or before other parties had acquired rights in the 
ground." 
This case is directly in point with the Brockbank case, 
except that in this case it was not a reposting on an earlier 
location where the corners had been marked, however, the 
full description of the property was contained in the location 
notice. Anyone desiring to discover the description could have 
done so. In this case, as in the Brockbank case, it was impos-
sible to locate the corners within the time required because 
of deep snow. Furthermore, it does not appear that a reason-
able time had elapsed after the snow had melted in the spring 
and before this contract was signed. It should further be 
pointed out that in this case there had been no rights acquired 
by other parties. No other claims had been filed on this prop-
erty. In fact the witness Hintze, himself, after having signed 
the contract with Kidder and Mrs. King, went out and refiled 
on the property himself in his own name. 
In regard to the eSect of mining laws and customs on 
filing of claims, the following language is found in 36 Am. 
Jur. 331: 
"Sec. 76. Miners' Rules and Customs. The recogni-
tion accorded by the Act of 1866 to the rules and cus-
toms developed by the miners of the West was not 
withdrawn when that enactment was superseded, for 
the present statute expressly declares that subject to 
certain stated requirements, 'the miners of each mining 
district may make regulations not in conflict with the 
laws of the United States, or with the laws of the state 
13 
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or territory in which the district is situated, governing 
the location, manner or recording, (and) amount of 
work necessary to hold possession of a mining claim.' 
Since these rules and customs have been adopted in 
most of the mining regions of the United States, it is 
evident that they constitute a large body of unwritten 
law which must be given effect in all cases wherein 
they do not conflict with the statutes. 
"It is not necessary that a custom be defined in writ-
ing, for it may be binding whether written or un-
written. Moreover, customs of this type are to be dis-
tinguished from ancient customs of the common lav/, 
which, to have force, must be immemorial and con-
tinuous." 
The authors of Corpus Juris treat the same subject at 58 
us Juris Sec, 65, in the following language: 
"Sec. 8. At an early day there grew up in the western 
and southwestern part of the United States certain cus-
toms and usages with respect to mining, and the cus-
toms and usages and rules and regulations whereby 
rights to mine were initiated and protected and all 
rights of liberty and property recognized were gen-
erally so fair and equitable that they were ultimately 
respected and recognized by the courts and regarded 
as the common law of mining. Under the federal 
statutes, 30 U.S.C.A. Sec. 28, the miners of each min-
ing district are still authorized to make rules and regu-
lations, not in conflict with the laws of the United 
States or with the laws of the state or territory in which 
the district is situated, governing the location of claims, 
the manner of recording, etc. 
"The applicability and effect of particular rules, 
regulations, and customs are considered infra Sections 
12-96/' 
14 
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According to Reynolds' testimony, the custom in the 
White Pine Mining District, due to the geographical location, 
was that the time requirement as to location of corners and 
the driving of the discovery shaft was tolled during the period 
when the land was inaccessible. This provision is not contrary 
to the laws of the United States nor to the laws of the state 
of Nevada. Therefore, it clearly appears from the evidence 
that the time in which to comply with these requirements 
had not expired. 
The courts of Nevada very early recognized the effect 
of mining customs. Two early cases on this point are Golden 
Fleece Gold & Silver Mining Co. v. Cable Consolidated Gold 
& Silver Mining Co., 12 Nev. 312, and Smith v. North Ameri-
can Mining Co., 1 Nev. 423. 
(c) FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH TIME REQUIRE-
MENTS IN THE LOCATION LAWS DOES NOT WORK 
A FORFEITURE IN THE ABSENCE OF AN INTERVEN-
ING VALID CLAIM. 
The appellant has based his argument on the grounds 
that Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder failed to comply with the 
requirement of marking the corners of the claim and driving a 
discovery shaft within the time required by law and has, with-
out citation of authority or without logical reason, jumped 
to the conclusion that such alleged failure worked a forfeiture 
of any rights of Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder to the unpatented 
mining claims. Even if this court were to hold, contrary to 
the argument of this respondent in the preceding section, that 
the corners had to be marked within 20 days and the dis-
15 
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covery shaft driven within 90 days, and that the local customs 
could not be allowed to toll this custom, still there would be 
no forfeiture of the rights of King and Kidder. There was 
no intervening filing or location between the date that Casselli 
placed the location monument and notices and the date of 
the contract here in question. The first work done on relocation 
of the claims after Casselli located them in the names of Mrs. 
King and Mr. Kidder was when the defendant Hintze fol-
lowing the execution of the contract caused them to be located 
in his own name. 
The following language is found in 58 C.J.S., 143: 
"A locator or owner of a mining claim may forfeit 
his claim by not complying with the statute requiring 
annual labor or improvements to be placed on it, but 
the forfeiture becomes complete and effectual only 
when another enters on the ground after the expiration 
of the time within which the labor may be done, and 
completes a relocation before resumption of work 
by the original locator, * * * ." 
A similar statement is found in 36 Am. Jur. 357, as fol-
lows: 
"While it is clear that a failure to do the work is 
in itself insufficient to affect the locator's title, the 
courts concur in holding that a valid relocation after 
such failure will completely extinguish his rights/' 
There are numerous cases holding that a failure to com-
ply with statutory requirements for the location work within 
the time limit does not work a forfeiture in the absence of an 
intervening claim. If no claim intervenes, the locator can pick 
16 
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up where he left off and proceed with his location and assess-
ment work and need not start again from the beginning. 
In the case of Oliver v. Burg, 58 Pac. (2d), 245, the Ore-
gon Supreme Court stated: 
''A forfeiture does not ensue from the failure to 
comply with the law. It requires the intervention of a 
third party and a relocation of the ground before any 
forfeiture can arise." 
The following language is in Whitwell v. Goodsell, 295 
Pac. 318: 
"While the failure to do the assessment work during 
the previous years 1922, 1923, 1924 and 1925 left the 
ground open to relocation at any time before the owner 
resumed work thereon, it did not have the effect of a 
forfeiture of the claim. The owner, no right of third 
parties having intervened, had a perfect right to do 
the assessment work in 1926 and if he did do the assess-
ment work for that year his title is good, not only 
against all others but against the government itself," 
In Law v. Fowler, 261 Pac. 667, the Supreme Court of 
Idaho stated: 
'The last ground for nonsuit is not tenable. If plain-
tiff had shown herself entitled to the possession of the 
Montezuma Claim by reason of a valid location or by 
adverse possession for the statutory period, the mere 
failure to perform the annual assessment work, in 
the absence of a valid subsequent location of part or all 
of the same ground, will not work a forfeiture." 
See also in this regard: 
Rush v. French (Ariz.), 25 Pac. 816. 
Emerson v. McWhitter (Calif.) 65 Pac. 1036. 
17 
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Snowy Peak Mining Co. v. Tamarack & Chesapeake 
Mining Co. {Idaho) 107 Vac. 60. 
Knutson v. Fredlund (Washington), 106 Pac. 200. 
Most of the above cases deal with failure to do assessment 
work. However, it appears that the same rule applies to any 
stage of the location work. For example, in the California 
case of Dripps v. Allison Mines Co., 187 Pac. 448, the claim-
ant failed to record the notice of filing in the time required by 
law and the court held that such failure, in the absence of an 
adverse filing, did not work a forfeiture of the claim. It ap-
pears clear, therefore, that based upon the work which they 
had done, Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder retained a property 
right in the unpatented mining claims until such right was 
cut off by an adverse filing, even if the laws be so construed 
as to place Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder in default on their lo-
cation work. 
II. MRS. KING AND MR. KIDDER MADE NO WAR-
RANTY AS TO THE UNPATENTED MINING CLAIMS. 
Although we have spent considerable time in this brief 
on the proposition that Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder did have 
a property interest in the unpatented mining claims, the de-
termination of that question is not necessary to the disposition 
of this appeal. They conveyed and were required to convey 
the unpatented mining claims only by Quit Claim Deed and 
made no warranty whatsoever as to such. It is well established 
that a Quit Claim Deed implies no warranty of title and 
conveys only such title as the grantor has, be that a fee title 
or be it nothing at all. 
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The following language is found at 16 Am. Jur. 625: 
'The decisions are in accord in holding that a quit-
claim deed passes all the right, title and interest which 
the grantor has at the time of making the deed which 
is capable of being transferred by deed, unless a con-
trary intent appears, and nothing more. * * * Where 
the grantor has no interest to convey, his quit-claim 
will be regarded as merely a release or formal dis-
claimer, notwithstanding the use of additional words 
of grant/' 
The authors of Corpus Juris state at 27 C.J.S. page 181: 
"A quit-claim deed is one which purports to convey, 
and is understood to convey nothing more than the 
interest or estate in the property described of which 
the grantor is seized or possessed, if any, at the time, 
rather than the property itself." 
This matter has likewise been passed upon by the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah in the case of Nix, et al v. Tooele 
County, 118 Pac. (2d) 376. The court stated: 
"Plaintiffs' title is founded upon quit-claim deeds. 
Such deeds do not imply the conveyance of any par-
ticular interest in property. See section 78-1-12, R.S.U. 
1933, as compared with section 78-1-11, R.S.U. 1933. 
Plaintiffs acquired only the interest of their grantors, 
be that interest what it may." 
In regard to what is conveyed by a Quit Claim deed, the 
appellant has quoted from American Jurisprudence, but has 
neglected to state to the court that the sections which he quotes 
are under the heading "Provisions for conveyance without 
warranty or with special warranty." 55 Am. Jur. 630. 
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The appellant has attempted to expand the conveyance 
of the unpatented mining claims into something more than a 
quit claim deed first, by attempting to apply other provisions 
of the contract, and secondly, by attempting to show an intent 
to give more than a quit claim deed by parol evidence of the 
circumstances surrounding the signing of the agreement. Let 
us examine these arguments in the order stated. Paragraph 9 
of the contract warrants that there are no outstanding debts, 
liens or claims against the property. A reading of the section 
in its context will indicate quite clearly that this provision 
refers only to the mining lease and option which was the major 
element of value being conveyed. Hintze first asserted, but 
then abandoned the assertion that there was some default in 
the mining lease and option. Had there been, such might have 
constituted a defense. However, as stated this provision of the 
statute does not apply to the unpatented mining claims. How-
ever, even if it should be construed to apply to the unpatented 
mining claims, there is no showing of any debts, liens or 
claims against these unpatented claims. Certainly there were 
no liens against it. The evidence is also clear that there were 
no intervening claims filed on these properties. It could not 
certainly be the contention of the appellant that the gov-
ernment's revisionary claim to any located property not yet 
patented was warranted against. The very use of the term 
unpatented mining claims which appears throughout the con-
tract would negative any such construction as this. 
Nor does there appear to be anything in the negotiations 
surrounding the execution of the contract which would indi-
cate that the quit claim deeds were actually intended to war-
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rant title. It is true that there was some element of value in 
the unpatented mining claims. A discovery of open ore show-
ings had been made thereon, although no development work 
had been done. Their principal value, however, was as pro-
tection to the more valuable working claims which were sub-
ject to the lease and to the option. 
Immediately upon signing the contract two courses of 
action were open to Hintze in regard to the unpatented min-
ing claims. Either he could proceed with the location and de-
velopment work based upon the monuments and notices of 
the location previously filed by Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder, 
or he could elect to start over with new location notices. This 
latter he elected to do and proceeded to do. It is evident, 
therefore, that he considered the quit claim deeds from Mrs. 
Kidder to these unpatented mining claims as disclaimers so 
that Hintze himself could start over with location and develop-
ment work which would eventually ripen into a patent. Al-
though Hintze filed the relocation of the claims in his own 
name, we must assume, in all fairness to Mr. Hintze, that 
at the time he later intended to convey them to the corporation 
to be formed. 
III. THERE WAS NO BREACH OF THE CONTRACT 
ON THE PART OF MRS. KING AND MR. KIDDER. 
The assertion of Hintze that he could not form the cor-
poration because of some asserted defect in the unpatented 
mining claims has a very hollow ring. As pointed out above, 
he first asserted this reason for not performing in his Amended 
Answer and Counterclaim filed on the 28th day of April, 
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1953, almost three years after the execution of the contract. 
In the meantime he had asserted and abandoned various other 
alleged reasons for failure to form the corporation. Further-
more, it is obvious that even if Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder 
had no interest in the unpatented mining claims, the ability 
of Mr. Hintze to form the corporation was not impaired. 
By the very fact that the claims were unpatented, Mr. Hintze 
must have known that in order for the corporation to realize 
the value of such claims it would have to follow through on 
location and development work and eventually secure a patent 
on these claims. As stated above, rather than to follow through 
on the location notices posted the previous fall, Hintze chose 
to post new locations in his own name. He was then in the 
same position, so far as his ability to follow through and secure 
a patent on the land, as he would have been had the defects 
in the unpatented claim filings which he alleges to exist not 
been present. 
CONCLUSION 
The points assigned to this court for consideration in 
this appeal are entirely without foundation. Hintze was faced 
with the fact that he had breached his contract. He found 
himself forced to abandon his earlier claim that the mining 
lease and option was in default. He then grasped at the straw 
of the condition of the unpatented mining claims. As pointed 
out above, this is not a defense-
First: because the time requirements were waived because of 
the inclement weather and the work was not in default; 
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Second: even if the work were construed as being in default, 
no forfeiture resulted because there were no intervening claims; 
Third: even if there were no rights in the unpatented claims 
in Mrs. King and Mr. Kidder, they made no warranty of title 
and so would not be in default; and 
Fourth: whatever the defects in the unpatented mining claims 
might have been, it did not interfere with the formation of the 
corporation for the reason that Hintze immediately proceeded 
to relocate said claims in his own name. 
The instruction of the trial court that the plaintiffs should 
be awarded nominal damages and such compensatory damages 
as the jury should find they are entitled to was, therefore, well-
founded. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON 
721 Continental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent 
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